QUASI-MARITAL CHILDREN: THE COMMON LAW’S FAILURE IN PRIVETTE AND DANIEL CALLS FOR STATUTORY REFORM
The Honorable Chris W. Altenbernd
For over two hundred years, the common law divided children into two categories—marital and nonmarital. The mother’s husband was automatically, and almost conclusively, the father of a marital child. The biological father of a nonmarital child was determined, when necessary, by bastardy or paternity proceedings. As recently demonstrated by two Florida Supreme Court cases, a third category of children has emerged—children who appear to be marital children but whose biological fathers are not their mothers’ husbands. Now that genetic testing can accurately, rapidly, and inexpensively determine paternity, this third category, “quasi-marital children,” presents distinct and complex legal issues regarding fatherhood.
THE CHANGED (AND CHANGING?) UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Larry T. Garvin
The Uniform Commercial Code of today is not the Uniform Commercial Code of our youth, or, in any event, of those halcyon days before law school. By now, almost every article has been revised at least once, and the last holdouts—Articles 1 and 2—are even now being changed, and will reach final form in a year or so. Indeed, we even have two new articles, covering leases of personalty and electronic funds transfers, and a new article on licensing may come forth in 2000.
BACK TO BASICS ON SCHOOL CONCURRENCY
David L. Powell
In recent years, Florida’s burgeoning public school enrollment has led to overcrowded schools in urban areas. One response by state and local leaders has been to find additional means to finance classroom construction. Another has been to look for ways to economize on capital outlays for educational facilities. Although school overcrowding is in essence a brick-and-mortar fiscal issue, a third response has been to search for a regulatory strategy directed at those who develop and build new neighborhoods where families reside.
JIMMY RYCE INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT FOR SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS’ TREATMENT AND CARE ACT: REPLACING CRIMINAL JUSTICE WITH CIVIL COMMITMENT
Mari M. “Miki” Presley
In this Comment I argue that the Jimmy Ryce Act represents an unconstitutional blurring between civil commitment and criminal incarceration. The commitment procedures established by the Act are outlined in Part II. In Part III, I challenge the conclusion that the Jimmy Ryce Act is civil and not criminal, and in Part IV, I question whether this Act legitimately defines sexual predators as “mentally ill.” In conclusion, I analyze the potential consequences of blurring the line between civil commitment and criminal incarceration.
ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT V. CONSOLIDATED-TOMOKA LAND CO.: DEFINING AGENCY RULEMAKING AUTHORITY UNDER THE 1996 REVISIONS TO THE FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Martha C. Mann
This Note will discuss the policy implications of the new rulemaking standard and the impact of the Consolidated-Tomoka opinion on future rule promulgation and challenges. The new rulemaking standard has already significantly impacted the role of administrative agencies in the implementation of laws. First, as demonstrated in Consolidated-Tomoka, the text of the new standard, though obviously a restraint on existing rulemaking authority, was facially unclear. The decision of the First District Court in ConsolidatedTomoka should assist agencies and those subject to agency rules in their future understanding of what “particular powers and duties” agencies must be granted in order to make rules. Second, the new rulemaking standard has rekindled criticism of the issuance of final orders by ALJs rather than by the agency. Where a rule challenge alleges an invalid exercise of delegated authority, should reviewing courts defer to the ALJ’s interpretation of the agency’s “particular powers and duties,” or to the agency’s interpretation? In some situations, deferring to the ALJ’s interpretation would directly conflict with the notion of administrative expertise in interpreting statutes. Third, the “look back” provision contained in section 120.536(2), Florida Statutes, requiring a review of all agency rules promulgated prior to the revisions, potentially violates the separation of powers doctrine where the statute allows the Legislature to veto the executive branch through the elimination of undesirable rules. Finally, despite the court’s decision in Consolidated-Tomoka, the new rulemaking standard may cause agencies to avoid rulemaking in favor of nonrule processes such as adjudication and policy statements. This result is in extreme conflict with the express desire in Florida for presumptive rulemaking, if at all feasible and practicable.